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Part One: crisis
Evelyn Fox Keller speaks about a kind of mental dancing, she calls the "one-
two step" - and the "two-one" step, in a paper outlining issues giving rise to a
"crisis in definition", especially among social categories like "men" and
"women". Referring to the frequent replacement of the term gender, by the term
women, when she tells people she works on gender and science: "how
interesting [they say] ... what is it that you've learned about women in science?"
She calls that "stage one; two genders and one science ... . the subject of
gender and science is fairly boring for those who stay at this stage." In stage
two "a slight increase in sophistication leads us to see these claims as
referring to "stereotypes" about gender ..... Now the subject of gender and
science becomes translated into "women aren't really unfitted for science; they
are only said to be so .... (i.e. the world is truly unitary, divided only in
appearance, either (merely) by language or (merely) by social convention. Our
task is to restore its natural unity." This she calls the two-one step; the move
that has been taken by women in science, because they were afraid that
"being different meant being less." (Kirkup and Keller, 1992, 42)
Those women who wanted to become scientists argued they were not
different, but there was a problem with this strategy. "Different from whom? ......
[she says] .... "The problem of the hidden referent in this strategy appeared not
to concern early feminists as much as modern ones .... the problem that
inheres in the fact that the universal standard is after all not neutral, of what
happens to our strategy and our thinking about gender and science when we
begin to notice that the universal man, is, in fact male. The first thing this
recognition enables us to do is to begin to make sense of the failure of the
promise of equity. To be included in the big "one" means not to be equally
represented, but to be unrepresented. It is to be swallowed up whole, negated
in the quest for assimilation - as it were, a hole in "one"." Fox Keller recognizes
some central features of the crisis, the politics of neutrality, the politics of
universality.
Denise Riley suggests that "the impermanence of collective identities in
general is a problem for any emancipatory movement."(Riley, 1992, 16) Since
a collectivity is comprised of a great variety of people, among whom there is
no single unifying feature, save their membership in the movement itself, and
since even the style and character of membership varies among persons,
critics rail against there being a "women's movement", and an "anti-racism"
movement. Sedgewick and others have called this a "definitional crisis" - this
refers to the idea that the coherence of definition is in crisis. Sedgewick
specifically refers to masculinity, explaining "that the crisis is systemic and
endemic is enabled only, and precisely, by its denial of the same fact."
(Sedgewick, 1990, 20)
A significant example of the "definitional crisis"is the suggested "paradox" of
feminism. "Women" do not want to be labeled, identified in any universal
fashion, neither by properties related to observers nor by properties which are
inherent, say, to "experiences" of women, not essentialized - and at the same
time - they mount liberatory movements, such as the feminist movement. Is this
not a contradiction? For many observers of this crisis, if gender categories are
shown to be unstable, or confused, then "gender" itself has to be seen to be
irrelevant, invalidated. Thus "women" is incoherent.
Some reformulations of concept theory, such as prototype theory, allow that
there are differences amongst members, but at the same time provide a
prototypical member, against whom alleged members are compared.
Attempting to employ anatomical or other similarities, as in contemporary
methods to provide a category "women" - there are suggested common
properties among women. Suppose prototype theory of concepts to be the
case, that members of the category will resemble a prototype: but not all
members will have any one of the same properties, in the least; not all women
will be white; not all will have two breasts, or will bear children, or will be
heterosexual. Not all will consider their gender as the primary category in their
descriptions - their race, their ethnicity, their sexual orientation might figure
first, any of the other relational identities after it in various orders. Thus, from
the point of view of subjective experiences, even though the experiences of
women might differ radically from those of men, there is no universally essential
mode of "women's" experiences. Further, "women" are variously abled, and
their abilities might figure first in their identities. Not all women are feminists,
and not all feminists are liberals, or socialists or feminists of difference. Not all
women are similarly oppressed; many are multiply oppressed, some
oppressions figure as more central to some women than to others - class -
race - gender. Still, essential to the problem here is that gender categories are
pervasive, woven throughout every sphere, every discourse of contemporary
culture. Categories structured around universals are politically homogenizing
and the role of signification in the construction of subjectivities is absent from
such categories.
Philosophy has a line on how "instability of terms" affects arguments, since
identification of meaning, and its consistent use in an argument, is important
for good reasoning. An argument founders, where the meanings of terms shift
within it. For traditional views, "obversion" operates (on terms) - deduction
operates - on truths - as does induction. Contraposition operates; but
instability, inconsistency, is supposed to be absent from, not constitutive of,
philosophical reasoning. Evidence and meaning are constitutive of good form;
consistency of meaning is essential for argument operation. Instability is lack of
clarity, lack of rigour, nonargumentative. What then, should one make of the
classical feminist interpretations of the history of philosophy, such as The Man
of Reason, in which, for example, Genevieve Lloyd argues that although there
is an "ideal of a Reason which knows no sex", that Reason has been
constituted through the exclusion of what has been perceived as "the
feminine". Even though Reason has been historically associated with
masculinity, Lloyd shows that associations of reason and masculinity are very
unstable in their applications. For Lloyd, the masculine character of reason is
enabled in spite of contradictions in the main texts of the canon. While
significant concepts do undergo change in meaning in the "canon," that is,
"mind", "knowledge", "sensing", "reason", do not have the same ascription
across the works of Plato, Descartes, or Kant, still, they may all still be
"gendered".
Many inconsistencies in the treatment of the category "women" have been
documented by various writers, such as Genevieve Lloyd, and feminists show
how "binarism" is hard to pin down. Men are aligned with mind, and women
with body; but men are also associated with physical strength, women with
bodily weakness. Women are linked with men , as participating in reason, and
alternately are aligned with nature, as being bodily. Men are associated with
God, as reasoning beings and against bodily elements, and shown to be
different from God, as being bodily, thus in unstable positions themselves, in
relation to the deity. These are simple examples of much more complex
issues, such as the following.
J.L. Halley argues that it is the very instability of definition concerning
homosexual identity which is crucial to the 'coercive' power of the homophobic
law. (Epstein & Kraub, 1991, 356) She claims that the incoherence within the
definition of homosexual, for American laws, functions in such a way as to
maintain the power of the law against homosexuals' actions and relations: but
undercutting it is the supposed binary opposition of heterosexual/homosexual
relations, which is undermined by its own instability in relation to
homosexuality. Halley discusses the instabilities in the definitions of
homosexuality - in American legal judgments. For example, homosexuality has
been described as genetic, embedded in one's genes, as an abnormality, not
a chosen life style (Halley 1991,359). On the other hand, homophobic
judgments in the law are often rendered with the excuse that familiarity with
homosexuals can prove dangerous for those who are heterosexual - or at least
who do not claim to be homosexual. "A key rationale for anti-homosexual
discriminations, then, is anxiety about the ambiguity of heterosexual
interactions, about a potential for mutability that undermines heterosexual
identity. Lest the change actually take place, "known" homosexuals must be
segregated". ( Halley 1991, 367). The differing forms of explanations of
homosexuality, featured in these definitions, allow for such interplay of
conflicting definitions, continue and "intensify a poisonous social discourse."
(Halley, 1991, 356)
Categories have been associated with venn diagrammatic constructions, in
discourses which insist upon essential features. In syllogistic logic, inclusion
and exclusion laws were fairly clearly fixed, the manner of identification is clear,
for tables, chairs, and for categories like men, women, human, and animal. The
strength of nominalism has always been its recognition that we construct
concepts, that concepts can change over time; but its weakness is a focus
upon a search for commonalities, for properties with which to establish
"naming" as such, when applied to social categories. Nominal definitions are
of a noun, usually a common noun, to give its linguistic meaning, and "women",
among other social categories, is understood as a common noun. "Typically
[the definition] is in terms of macrosensible characteristics : e.g. yellow
malleable metal, for gold." (Dictionary of philosophy) Nominalism, in spite of its
strengths, presents inadequate features for analysing social categories like
"women". When politics is encapsulated in the naming of a group of persons,
where such actions name and define upon those named, affecting their lives,
having political consequences, it is essential to recognize both the logic and
rhetoric of categories, the context of socio-political, and philosophical,
construction.
Categories have been linked to stereotypes, wherein resemblance is based
on judgments made on the basis of incomplete information, which mimics
"knowledge" in a vague and usually crude manner. Lorraine Code says
"women do not simply don a stereotype as they might a costume or a role; this
is not a matter of superficial overlay. They are encoded by, marked with
stereotypes, from earliest infancy." (Code 1991, 190)
Here again, categories and stereotypes are linked by nominalist (stereotyping
properties) and realist (essentialist stereotyping) conditions, but without
acknowledgement of the "accumulated cultural lore" which backgrounds the
stereotype. As sources of knowledge, they give information about identities, by
noticing "properties", and ignoring the rhetorical underwritings of socio-political
structures informing the generalizations.
Where it is a case of metaphysical realism, where "real" definitions are said to
specify metaphysically necessary and sufficient conditions for being the kind of
thing a common noun designates - e.g. the elements with the atomic number
79 for gold - the essentializing tendencies of realism are inadequate for the
construction of social categories. Furthermore, these are still property based;
atomic number a property of all gold; common to all gold, just as the attempts
to describe a universally figured "women's way of knowing", is essentializing.
The term "metaphysical" - implying a universality amongst the entities which
comprise the category. Nominalists might argue that universals are simply
names organizing particulars, but these names have been based in a sorting
through commonable attributes, and further, have political consequences.
Although only individuals exist for nominalists, the connections among them are
through properties.
Where membership in traditional categories has been given by some common
property - in the relevant sense of being a "thing and its properties" - among
the individuals which constitute the set or class, members are those individuals
that have all the same relevant properties. Each set divides the universe into
distinct realms, excluding the possibility of individuals that belong to neither or
to both of these realms, where the realms are women and men. Feminist
philosophers justifiably critique this formulation of categories, and reject
notions of identity arising from them.
This failure on the part of feminists to accept nominalist or realist accounts in
toto, results in what is meant to be the core of the general complaint against
"postmodernists", among whom are included many poststructuralists, that anti-
essentialism results in meaninglessness. Since the category "women" will not
hold up under any "property" scrutiny, it is considered compromised, and thus
meaningless itself. In my view such a critique has no bearing on the actualities,
there is no such "meaninglessness"; the feminist critique is rather evidence of
an attempt to recognize particular kinds of categories as not adequately met
by those which investigate common properties, so to rid them of their
problematic original formulations, and acknowedge their complexities. This, it
seems, is a rather sensible philosophical enterprise. Essentialism is a way of
defining which "reifies" the attributes associated with a particular category,
such as women. It finds "unchanging " properties in entities, neglecting to
notice the influence of language , culture, and social relations, which produce
and influence the way categories are understood, and the stereotypes which
many employ in their use. The feminist critique notices the influences of
language, culture, social relations, recognizes the production of categories as
quite distinct from those which employ an analysis applicable to a "thing and its
properties".
Part Two - Rhetoric and philosophy
Michael Billig, who spoke at OSSA in 1997, argued that rhetoric "provides the
means of opening up matters for thought and discussion", and notices that it
may also provide the means for closing down topics, and thereby, be an
avenue for repressive practices. For him, "language can be expressive and
repressive." (Billig, 1996, 1). While he wanted to point out that in ordinary
speech, "that to which we are not attending" is of interest, and can be
unconscious rhetoric, and thus not applied specifically to this issue, I believe
the structure of his account would be sympathetic. It is important to
acknowledge the presence of rhetoric in the construction of social categories,
and see the interaction of rhetoric as both possibly positive and possibly
negative, in philosophical treatment. Philosophy is only apparently built upon
non-contradiction.
In this section, I describe some uses of rhetoric in philosophical texts,
examples of acceptable and unacceptable employment of rhetoric by
philosophers. I undermine any philosophy/ rhetoric exclusivity, in support of
such philosophers as Le Deouff, in showing that social categories have a
rhetorical dimension.
One way in which rhetoric has functioned in philosophical argument is very
simple. In order to highlight some feature of a philosopher's work, a writer will
"downplay" some other alleged centrality, to expose the significance of the first
feature. This is one way of being rhetorical, that most of us use regularly when
we isolate some structure, some logic, some conceptual analysis in a text, and
de-emphasize some other. This is an acceptable, and commonplace use of
rhetorical devices.
Michele Le Doeuff discusses the various and significant parts that images play
in the philosophical enterprise. Images are threaded throughout all
philosophical work, and are powerful cases of rhetorical positioning.
"Interpretation of imagery in philosophical texts goes together with a search for
points of tension in a work. In other words, such imagery is inseparable from
the difficulties, the sensitive points of an intellectual venture ... the meaning
conveyed by images works both for and against the system that deploys them.
" (Le Doeuff, 1980, 3) One could scarcely understand the point of someone
else's ideas without the imagery contained within it. Consider how distinct are
the images of an organic nature, and nature as a machine, and the
contributions to our understanding of the significance of the differences
between the two formulations of nature, that the imagery itself structures.
Scientific models based in such metaphors differ radically. (Longino, Fox
Keller, Harding) Le Doeuff refers us to some pages of Bacon, where he
mentions "mental trip ... the shores of error ... island of truth ... mighty ocean ...
storms of illusion" - in Kant, that we should "fix our dwelling in the land of
understanding, and prevent the understanding, which has at last applied itself
to its proper, empirical employment, from wandering off elsewhere." (Le
Deouff, 1980, 11) Here, Kant's understanding has a "proper use", but can
"wander off", can be misemployed, this image having a disapproving,
moralistic tone, about its wandering off on other "ventures".
Feminists recognize that such spatial relations as "internal" and "external" are
metaphorical, and not simply "descriptive" in the sense traditionally meant by
"factually" descriptive. Logic too includes images; it includes some
geometrical imagery, e.g. in venn diagrams, images of exclusion, inclusion;
paradoxes and contradictions; the image for the negation of "A", a claim, is
chaos, that is to say, a claim and its contradictory cannot be the case: from a
contradiction, chaos follows. Everything follows, and so, meaninglessness.
Philosophy has always employed imagery, "imagery and knowledge form ... a
common system," says Le Doeuff. Sometimes philosophers have given
excuses for using imagery, as though it were important to explain why such
"nonphilosophical" strategy was present in a text, but much of the time, it is
simply employed, and its significance denied. Le Doeuff argues that the
contradictory status of imagery serves to uphold philosophical arguments; and
since it is present but at the same time denied, it is not taken seriously.
In connection with contradictories, the contradictory definitions that have been
ascribed to women have also functioned to sustain the power dynamics of
certain forms of naming "women" and identifying them. In philosophy, just as in
other works, textual conflicts are rhetorical, they work to maintain certain power
dynamics; certain centralities in functioning, just as we saw in the case of
Halley and American legal judgments cited earlier. Sometimes instability in a
given site of sexual or gender category has effects which are anything but
destabilising, as we've seen in the case of Halley and the definitions of
homosexuality as a category of sexual orientation. By containing both
assertions that women lack reason, in particular ways (say in Rousseau) and
are closer to reason (because of their closeness to nature), by shifting
definitions both of reason, nature, and also of "women", a text can protect itself
from some critiques through ambiguities. Furthermore, there is an issue
relating to such awareness of contradictions; pointing out a contradiction does
not necessarily have the effect of making changes in consciousness of the
work. Pointing out instability can actually have the effect of solidifying it.
"Trouble", as Butler calls it, has been central to the understanding of "women",
in the philosophical canon. The history of philosophy has not generated stable
accounts of women and femininity; so in employing the structures of
nominalism, or realism, contemporary philosophers miss a central feature of
feminist debates: the history of philosophy has been shot through with
ambivalent attitudes, with incoherence, contradictions in association between
masculinity and reason, femininity and reason. Instability can open up, or close
down, discourses.
Part Three: Rhetoric and social categories
Feminists have generated various ways of treating categories, so as to give
new insights which recognize the realities of rhetoric in gender construction. In
Am I that Name?, Denise Riley calls the category of women a changing
"compacted doctrine"; this description emphasises the ideological component
in such a category, identifying part of the rhetorical status of social categories.
The "doctrine" in question is about Otherness, differences, "women are
established by and against altering categories of nature, class, reason,
human." She argues it is necessary to embrace the contradiction that women
"don't exist, and yet there is a women's movement." In suggesting that we
embrace the contradiction, she is using a rhetorical device, which one can
recognize for what it is, accepting on the one hand that "women" are not
universalizable, and still, we can have the movement. Yet she does not go far
enough in understanding the significance of the apparent paradox, and thus
makes a "category" mistake.
Riley says, "The world behaves as though "women" unambiguously exist; and
official suppositions and conservative popular opinions have to be countered
constantly by redefinitions. Identity depends upon context, is double edged;
and feminists at one and the same time must concentrate on the identities
given, and refuse them, since it is the case with identities that they can be
wielded against you just as often as in your favour."( Riley, 1988, 112) Again,
issues surrounding identity are precisely about categorization by others, in
terms of gesturing toward the necessity to focus upon 'identities' and refuse
them at the same time. She insists women take this up, act upon it. At one and
the same time, feminists suggest that "women" don't exist, and maintain a
politics of "as if they existed" with the analysis of the category of women, the
feminist account is anti-essentialist, there is "no underlying core of persons to
whom the descriptions of women bandied about over history have actually
applied" (Riley, 1988, 112).
"Women" is discursively constructed, and in internal relations with other
categories which are themselves changing or at issue. "Women is a volatile
collectivity in which female persons can be very differently positioned, so the
apparent continuity of the subject of women isn't to be relied on." (Riley,1988,
2) Riley says that what "Foucault did for the concept of the homosexual as an
invented classification just cannot be done for women, who indubitably existed
long before the nineteenth century unfolded its tedious mania for fresh
categorizations." (Riley, 1988, 3) She speaks about the positioning of women,
in the use of the category "women". "This positioning occurs both in language,
forms of description, and what gets carried out, so that it is misleading to set
up a combat for superiority between the two. "(Riley, 1988, 3) This recognition
that positioning occurs in discourse and activities may be quite accurate, but
Riley does not give an account of why it is so simple to accomplish the
positioning. It is possible because generally, people rely on a traditional notion
of category, as descriptive of universal common elements; wish to uncover
commonable experiences, universally held, and essentializing tendencies,
common because the beings in question are said to have common properties.
It is by relying on the construction of category as property-based, that Riley
commits her "category" mistake. There are different forms of categories, with
different applications.
Haraway's understanding of "gender" as relational is more on the mark: she
says that "gender is a relationship, not a preformed category of beings, or a
possession one can have. Gender does not pertain more to women than to
men, it isn't about women as such, in spite of its origin as an explanation of
women ... Gender is the relation between variously constituted categories of
men and women (and variously arranged tropes), differentiated by nation,
generation, class, lineage, colour, and much else) " (Haraway, 1997, 28) Thus,
"men" too is unstable, in the definitions of all the great gender configurings
performed by Hegel, by Kant, Hume, Augustine, by Rousseau; Beavouir;
everyone gives each gender contradictory and unstable input.
Social categories have been mistakenly treated as "property-oriented", viz.,
regarding colour, genitalia, emotional or rational attributes; having such
"features" or "properties" enables certain expectations and stereotypes of
women and men; social categories are rather relational, not about identifying
properties of bodies, experiences, or faculties, but are discourses about how
persons stand in relation to one another; or how persons stand in relation to
nature; they are real political categories, whether of nature, humanity, sex,
gender, ethnicity; the meanings of war, power, abuse, homosexuality. Since
social categories are constituted by relationships, they shift as their relations
shift. Meanings also shift, and feminists have tried to keep shifting the
meanings, sometimes in order precisely to avoid any essentializing
tendencies. But sometimes meanings shift opportunistically as in the texts of
the canon, they shift to make it impossible to fix the significance of the political
consequences, and they avoid the critique of "essentializing" while at the same
time maintaining a power over those actually figured by the contradictory
meanings of the categories. Consider, for example, how in Carole Pateman's
work on social contract theory, she discusses how the liberal household shifts
to take women as "workers" into itself, and retain the public/private realms, and
the division of labour remaining much the same. The shift in taking women in to
the workplace does not have any revolutionary affects, but rather congeals the
already present, and problematized, public/private divisions, and divisions of
labour in the household.
Confusions abound in response to the issues of a crisis in definition, regarding
the options for re-vising our understanding of this category. The suggestion of
an "independent" category, which is one we will look at briefly, will that not be
simply reversing the oppressive strategy that is arguably extant, resulting in a
new dichotomous polarity, with women at the top, and everything that is "not-
women" in the formless chaos? Again, how can one create a "neutral"
category, or pseudoneutral - how can persons do this, taking into account the
significant dimensions of race and culture? Can one have a category of
"women" without acknowledging the constitutive relationships of race and
culture? that too would marginalize, would ignore aspects of elements which
constitute the political movement, the metaphysical realities, of "women". The
problem with "women", as traditionally defined, was in part a problem to do
with definition of species; biological taxonomy, "what one is". If one disavows a
a connection between species categories and social categories, and takes
"women", "men", "nature", as social political categories where species, and
set membership, are not the issues, one can see many more possibilities
available for ontologies. One cannot have closure against identity categories of
this kind, no metaphysical identity closures for social categories.
In a paper called "The Necessity of Differences: Constructing a Positive
Category of Women", Marilyn Frye reminds us about Loreena Bobbitt,
describing two "styles of white feminism" which tried to respond to her actions,
and in Frye's view failed. Frye's position is intended to open up some space,
philosophical/political space, to show plural identities as essential to
categories. A central element in her argument, which contributes to my
purpose, is her suggestion to her readers that women have to construct a
logically positive category, without reference to other categories as such, e.g.
without reference to men, and without reference to any essentializing qualities.
The suggestion that one cannot have reference to essentializing features will
not surprise any who have encountered postmodern or poststructuralist
writings. What Frye means to criticize is essentially the property-oriented
labelling that has occurred in category construction. (Frye, 1996, 992)
"Until a positive category of women is historically constructed, the man/woman
distinction will be the A/not-A universal and exclusive dichotomy .... it cannot be
dismantled or deconstructed by being folded in on itself." (Frye, 1996, 997)
Frye claims that "defining" does not have to be essentializing. She argues that
what she calls "pseudodualistic monism" is not the only kind of logic of
categories, (Frye, 1996, 997) claiming there is a logic of category construction
congenial to this project as a practice of pluralism. Frye rejects the idea that
there is anything to be gained by trying to appropriate and revalue any parts or
aspects of patriarchally constructed femininity, a strategy taken by some
feminists. Frye notices that after all two is a plurality, logically, since there is
really a pseudo-dualism in the case of gender. In her essay, Frye suggests
that, in reality, " A/ not A" is not a dualism: it does not construct two things; i.e.
the category of vanilla and the category of not vanilla - the second one is an
infinite undifferentiated plenum, unstructured, formless, a chaos; no internal
boundaries". Frye is suggesting that the dualistic dichotomous position, is only
rhetorical, not at all a matter of logical relations, it does not reflect reality. The
rhetorical device of "not distinguishing" also operates: "the man/not-man
dichotomy makes no distinctions on the not-man side. This helps make it so
"natural" to lump women indiscriminately with children in "women and children"
and to cast "nature" (which is another name of not-man) as a woman, and
woman as nature". (Frye, 1996, 1000) .... It also illuminates the fact that women
are so easily associated with disorder, chaos, irrationality, and impurity. ... the
set-theoretic mold actually is rhetorically powerful." She asks what we need "for
something to precipitate out of the infinite undifferentiated plenum."
Presence of internal structure, Frye says, establishes the setting off of a thing
or a sort of thing (a category) from its environment. Structure is a set of
relations; and relations stand between differentiated individuals in the case of
the category of "women", and these relations are internal relations within the
category. One of Frye's messages is that creating this category is a liberation
strategy. 'Women' themselves name themselves; call themselves "women", call
attention to the politics necessary for their emancipation. In the type of category
to which she refers, centrality of differences among women is understood as
important to the constructive political project. Differences amount to some kind
of internal structure, in that the various interwoven relationships among the
movements within the feminist movement, constitute "women", as do,
precisely, relations outside of the category. Thus, various groupings of women
come together, with varying aims - perhaps an artists' collective, a musician's
collective, groups of women come together sometimes to lobby for health care
changes; each of these groupings too, has interactions with others within the
category, and their differing forms of specializations, their different interests
and experiences, give structure to the category that is being developed. But in
all of these, we are not determining "features" that are universalizable, that are
commonable characteristics that are substantive, it is the relations themselves
that are substantive, the elements, the persons, that are substantive.
Frye is right; one does not necessarily essentialize, in defining, if one is
recognizing relations as constitutive of such social categories. The point, in
part, is that philosophy has always been riddled through with politics, but if one
does not focus on the politics, it is difficult to see it. In Haraway's naming of
gender as a power relation, determined by those in power, we see an overlap
in meaning with Frye; in order to establish a category of women, women claim
their identities as relational with others, it is only "women" who can create the
category. Frye and Haraway each finds that women have been named in
particular negating ways by oppressive practices of language and culture.
There is, from my own point of view, a confusion that appears to be suggested
in Frye, that an external observer cannot fail to "essentialize" or to find
commonable features that essentialize. If a philosopher is careful to examine
the relations and elements which constitute categories, it is not necessary to
essentialize, and thus, one can have a regard for relations among social
categories that does not replicate the supposed or alleged dichotomies, or
pseudo-neutral monisms. It is possible to come to some understanding, even
from outside the category, of what is being constituted.
A category such as "women" is being defined by internal relations and
differences, and not by negating others, or other groups, says Frye. Meanings
and subjectivities are generated not by negation but by "multiple
nonoppositional contrasts and relations among, and constituting, positive
elements." (Frye, 1996, 1003) Here she refers to the nonoppositional contrasts
among features, negation of features or properties as inessential to social
category formations. It is not necessary to refer to such features, either with
respect to women, or to men, in these social categories.
Part Four: conclusions
The paradox to which I refer in the introduction is a "rhetorical" paradox, in the
"closing down" form of rhetoric, but it is a spurious form, not a compelling
rhetoric. It is itself a fiction which invalidates, which dismisses rather than
opens up political spaces. Simply because some categories are impossible to
mould into the property-based analyses available in nominalism, realism and
conceptualism, we do not therefore accept that categories such as "women",
"men", "nature", are really "meaningless". A relational logic, not a logic of the
thing and its properties, discloses a great deal about social categories.
Rhetoric is an important, and visible, feature of social categories. It always has
been. When "what one is" is one's species - for so long - in the shadow of
Aristotle, then taxonomy is itself functioning in a fundamentally rhetorical
fashion. If we think of belonging to a social category as participation, as
choosing to identify ourselves as participating in a category, then it becomes
more a matter of relations, of affinities we choose, elective affinities. If what I
am is constantly being co-constructed with and in relation to different others,
there is no single absolute "what I am", in spite of relatively stable contextual
frames.
It is rhetoric, on the part of the 'realist', to insist that there has to be some kind
of universal property- oriented definition, to insist that social categories too,
must fit into the kind of categorical slot that books and tables do, and even if
that categorical slot is one which attempts to uncover "essential" experiences
that women have, that differentiate women from men. Properties, essential
qualities, must be determinative, such a realist would say, of nature or reality
that will help us to identify 'x' as a thing of that sort. There is a place for
categories which operate as definitions, just as there is a place for binary
dualisms; the lamp is on or off. It may depend upon how sunny the day is, but it
is either "on" or "off" in my study. But of course "on" is defined by being
distinguished from "off".
Does this mean that feminists cannot be metaphysical realists? Of course they
will not be, if we understand realism in the way described above. If we alter our
understanding of both metaphysics and realism, and recognize that our
ontology cannot be one of properties and things, but must be an ontology of
relations among persons as elements in relation, some form of realism is
possible. Indeed the mode of construction of the social category suggest that
to be significant within the construction.
The point is, it is the members of the category who have to be self-determining
in this way. They affirm membership of the category, "women" - not some
"other", who in figuring the members with certain properties oppresses. In this
way, we can see that one feature of a nominalist position is taken by this
account, that categories are constructed, but the aspect of nominalism that
regards essential attributes or properties as identity features is rejected. There
are differences acceptable within the category, otherness within the category,
rather than between varying definitions of properties common to persons. The
paradox is spurious, "women"are not trying to name ourselves, and refrain
from being named, or essentialize ourselves and at the same time deny
esssentialism - it is not a form of self-deception, or philosophical invalidation.
A movement of this kind is surely about the problems of essentializing because
of the misapplication of categories as either nominalist, or realist. Those who
employ this argument against feminists are using categories from a property-
oriented logic; the classes, which focus on salient properties common to
things. If we employ a logic wherein categories are principally comprised of
relations, the social categories are relationships, self determining among
persons, and are logically positive (i.e. not negated "attributes" of some other
category), are non-essentializing, and yet are also explanatory. Feminists have
gestured continuously to the reality that there never has been a stable property-
based definition of women; that relations have always constitued the meanings
of women, and of men, of gender itself. This surely is a form of realism. Social
category construction is both rhetorical, and logical, that is to say, it employs,
explicitly employs, the politics of identity, and the politics itself reveals both the
rhetoric and the logic of category construction.
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